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This paper argues that an external monitor can be less eﬀective when there is
uncertainty regarding the quality of the management and the business environ-
ment. In a two-period model, an outside monitor, who initially does not know
managerial quality, can have the manager ﬁred. The manager makes investment
decisions based on noisy but informative private information, and if she is the
empire-building type, derives private beneﬁts from over-investment. Uncertainty
imposes extra costs on the monitor, and leads to equilibrium in which the risk-
neutral monitor gives up monitoring ex ante. The model highlights the limits of
external monitoring, and suggests that outside monitoring cannot fully substi-
tute for internal monitoring by the board. Some implications of this model are
conﬁrmed in empirical tests.
1Introduction
It is often recognized in the theoretical literature (Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Ad-
mati, Pﬂeiderer, and Zechner (1994), Kahn and Winton (1998), Maug (1998), Allen,
Bernardo, and Welch (2000), Noe (2002), etc.) that the presence of an outside large
shareholder can improve ﬁrm value. However, many models have simply assumed a
positive value impact of an outside monitor, without pursuing further the mechanism
through which value improvements can occur.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) oﬀer a model in which an outside large shareholder
takes over a ﬁrm and brings about value improvements. They assume that the outside
large shareholder can discover better technology and can manage ﬁrms better. As
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) point out, the hostile takeover market, which served as
a disciplinary force in the 1980s, has largely disappeared in the 1990s. Furthermore,
an outside shareholder rarely sits in a corporate boardroom, or takes over the entire
company. Is there an alternative mechanism through which an outside shareholder can
bring about value improvement?
This paper oﬀers such an alternative mechanism, in which an external monitor can
pressure the board to remove the manager.1 It also shows that outside monitoring
can be limited. The model focuses on whether an outside monitor can improve a
ﬁrm’s investment eﬃciency. It argues that outside monitoring in reality may not be as
eﬀective as one often believes, where there is often noisy and asymmetric information,
and where some managers enjoy “empire-building.”
Firm investment activity often suﬀers agency costs. Jensen’s free cash ﬂow theory
predicts that managers tend to waste ﬁrms’ free cash when they face fewer positive
NPV projects. Furthermore, Jensen (1986) argues that managerial “empire-building”
1This assumption is consistent with empirical ﬁndings by Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999), which
document a higher top management turnover rate for ﬁrms targeted by activist institutions.
2behavior leads to ineﬃcient investment decisions. When the manager’s interest is not
perfectly aligned with shareholders’, the standard performance-based compensation
policy may not be able to induce an eﬃcient investment outcome. Many researchers
believe that an outside monitor may play a crucial role in promoting shareholders’
interest, exactly in cases like this.
However, this paper shows that an outside shareholder may decide not to monitor
due to noisy and asymmetric information. In a simple model, the market initially does
not know whether the manager intends to build her empire or intends to maximize
shareholder wealth. At the beginning of the two-period model, the monitor is uncertain
about the manager and needs to decide how much to invest in monitoring technology.
The manager’s private information regarding investment proﬁtability is noisy, and can
not be veriﬁed by the outside monitor. The “empire-building” manager’s “reputation
concerns” — the fear of being discovered and subsequently removed — help to discipline
him from value-reducing activity in the early stage of his tenure. The uncertainty in
the model imposes additional monitoring cost and limits the monitor’s capability to
improve eﬃciency. As an equilibrium outcome, the monitor will commit to monitoring
only under limited circumstances.
The predictions of this paper highlights the limit of external monitoring, and the
importance to have eﬀective internal monitoring. Being an outsider, an institutional
investor is not able to verify the private information received by the manager. In
contrast, a board can obtain information to verify the manager’s private information
and reduce the cost associated with information asymmetry. An independent and
eﬀective board can be a better monitor under the conditions speciﬁed in this model.
In recent years, many activist institutional investors have advocated for board in-
dependence2 and the ability for shareholders to nominate their own directors. For
2For example, to determine its Focus List, a list of ﬁrms to target, CalPERS uses the following
criteria regarding the board structure: 1) board size of between 6-15 members; 2) non-classiﬁed
3example, CalPERS, the New York State Common Retirement Fund, the American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Pension Funds, and the Illinois
State Board of Investment jointly ﬁled a proxy proposal in 2004 to give shareholders
the right to nominate up to two directors on Disney’s board. It has been a growing
issue, sparking much controversy. The implication of this paper suggests that their
actions may be well justiﬁed.
Some of the predictions of the model can be empirically tested. Major public
pension funds started to actively participate in governance activity in the later half of
the 80s. I ﬁnd that prior to 1985, their shareholdings have no eﬀect on ﬁrm investment
spending. After 1985, the presence of major public pension funds is associated with a
reduction in investment spending. However, this eﬀect is reduced by 50% when there
is a high level of business uncertainty and the management is more likely to enjoy a
good reputation.
The rest of the paper is organized as following. Section I reviews the related liter-
ature. Section II introduces the model. Section III describes the equilibrium outcome.
Section IV tests empirically some of the predictions. And section V concludes.
1 Literature Review
The monitoring role of large shareholders is much discussed in the theoretical literature.
In Admati, Pﬂeiderer, and Zechner (1994), it is assumed that a large investor can aﬀect
a security’s expected payoﬀ through monitoring. Maug (1998) models the positive
eﬀect that market liquidity has on monitoring. Kahn and Winton (1998) study a
large shareholder’s choice between trading and monitoring. Noe (2002) characterizes
board; 3) separate Chair/CEO; 4) lead director; 5) greater than 75% independent directors; 6) 100%
independent directors on nominating committee; 7) 100% independent directors on audit committee;
8)100% independent directors on compensation committee; 9) “no members of the board are related
to each other, or to senior management.”
4an equilibrium in which monitoring is stochastic. In those models, it is assumed that
interventions by the outside monitor will improve share prices. A recent paper by
Admati and Pﬂeiderer (2005) shows that large shareholder exit can have a disciplinary
impact.
Although the assumption that an outside investor will monitor and improve ﬁrm
value is reasonable, it is interesting to explore how, indeed, the monitor can improve
ﬁrm values. After all, it is the manager who makes the operating decisions that im-
mediately aﬀect the ﬁrm value. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) present a model in which
the presence of a large shareholder increases the likelihood of a takeover and hence
increases the share price. They regard informal negotiations with the management as
being less eﬀective in improving the ﬁrm’s operating strategy, compared to a takeover.
This paper attempts to oﬀer an alternative mechanism.
In my model, an outside monitor is able to discover the true type of the manager and
is able to terminate an “empire-building” manager once he is discovered. This paper
focuses on the outside monitor’s ability to improve investment eﬃciency. Jensen’s free
cash ﬂow theory predicts that managers tend to waste the free cash when they face
fewer positive NPV projects. Stulz (1990) and Hart and Moore (1995) explore how
an optimal ﬁnancing policy can reduce this cost of managerial discretion. This paper
does not model the eﬀect of capital structure on investment. Its main interest lies
in how an outside monitor can reduce ineﬃcient investment when “empire-building”
managers want to over-invest. This model implicitly assumes that there is enough
internal funding for the investment. This simpliﬁcation may be justiﬁed by the fact
that the problem of overinvestment is more prevalent when there is enough free cash
on hand.
This paper is also related to the career-concern and reputation literature. Holm-
strom (1999) points out that younger managers with career concern will overwork when
5managerial ability is unknown initially and managerial eﬀort is unobservable. Scharf-
stein and Stein (1990) show that managers mimic the decisions of other managers
in their investment decisions due to their reputation concerns. Gibbons and Murphy
(1992) show empirically that the implicit incentives from career concerns are much
larger for younger managers. In this paper, the uncertainty about a manager is not
his eﬀort level or his ability, but his intention. The negotiation process of the contract
between the manager and the ﬁrm is not modeled and is assumed to be exogenous.
This model also assumes that the players are risk-neutral, hence the optimal contract
will guarantee that the manager will exert the maximum possible eﬀort. It is also as-
sumed in this paper that both “empire-building” and “non-empire-building” managers
observe the same noisy signal. This is equivalent to the assumption that both types of
managers are equally capable. The only diﬀerence between the two types of managers
lies in whether they derive private beneﬁts from investments.
Sobel (1985) presents a model in which it pays for an agent to build a reputation and
cash in later. Benabou and Laroque (1992) show that noisy private information allows
insiders to manipulate prices repeatedly. Similar to their setup, the “empire-building”
manager in my model can hide behind the noisy private information he receives. It is
not uncommon for an outside shareholder to be uncertain about the manager, and for
the ﬁrm-relevant information received by the manager to be noisy. This paper explores
the conditions under which an outside monitor can be eﬀective under these kinds of
circumstances.
62 The Model
This is a two-period model with two players — a manager and an outside large share-
holder. At the beginning of the game, the large shareholder3 decides whether to invest
in a monitoring technology and how much to invest. At the beginning of each period,
the manager observes a private, noisy, but informative signal about the proﬁtability of
an investment opportunity, then makes investment decisions.
An Outside Large Shareholder
At time 0, a risk-neutral large outside shareholder (e.g., an institutional investor)
is endowed with ω ownership of the company’s share. His gain from the investment
is proportional to his holdings in the ﬁrm. He can choose to invest x in a monitoring
technology at time 0, which enables him to discover the true type of the manager
with a probability f(x) = bx
1+bx when the investment is not proﬁtable. f(x) ∈ (0,1),
and is a continuous and concave function reﬂecting diminishing returns. The large
shareholder can punish the manager for bad returns even when the manager’s type
remains unknown. The punishment G(λt), where λt is his assessment of how likely the
manager is the “good” type at time t, is lower if he believes that the manager is more




The monitoring costs, the monitoring technology, and the punishment are common
knowledge.
Two Types of Managers
A risk-neutral manager owns the remaining shares of the company with 1 − ω
ownership. He observes at the beginning of the game whether the monitor invests
3For the rest of the paper, the following three phrases: the large shareholder, the outside share-
holder, and the monitor, will be used interchangeably.
7in a monitoring technology and how much the investment is. He makes investment
decisions in both periods. At the beginning of each period, the manager receives
an investment opportunity and a signal indicating its proﬁtability. The sizes of the
investment projects are normalized to 1. If the investment is proﬁtable, it returns R
= a, if not, returns R = -a.
The manager’s utility is a linear and additive function of the expected investment
returns on his share 1 − ω, his private beneﬁts from investment, and the expected
punishment.
There are two types of managers. The “good” type maximizes the expected invest-
ment returns. His utility if he invests is Ug(R,G(λt)) = E[(1 − ω)R] − E[G(λt)]. The
“empire-building” type of manager derives private beneﬁts, B = ka (k ≥ 1), from any
investment. His utility if he invests is Ub(R,B,G(λt)) = E[(1 − ω)R + B] − E[G(λt)].
The Information Structure
The outside shareholder does not know the manager’s type initially. Let λ0 ∈ (0,1)
denote his estimate at time 0 of the probability that the manager is good. This is the
manager’s initial reputation, which is common knowledge.4
At the beginning of each period, the manager observes a private, noisy, but infor-
mative signal {-1,1} indicating the proﬁtability of the investment opportunity. Each
signal (1 or -1) occurs with probability 1/2. The signals are accurate with probability
γ ∈ (1/2,1). This accuracy is common knowledge. The outside shareholder can only
observe the manager’s action {I,N} (I —invest; N — no investment), and the outcome
of the investment {-a, a}. The outside shareholder wants the manager to invest only
when he receives a good signal.
When the investment yields positive returns, the shareholder’s monitoring eﬀort
4For example, the initial reputation may be formed according to some commonly observable signals.
8uncovers no new information about the manager. When the investment fails, his mon-
itoring can uncover the manager’s true type with probability f(x) ∈ (0,1).
The Game and the Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
This two-period model deﬁnes a game between the large shareholder and the man-
ager. At time 0, nature chooses the type of the manager (i ∈ {b,g}). The shareholdings
of the monitor, ω, is given exogenously. The monitor forms a prior, λ0, on the type
of the manager and then decides whether to invest in a monitoring technology and
how much to invest, x ∈ (0,∞). Then the ﬁrst period begins. The manager faces an
investment project, which requires investment ˜ S = 1. He observes his private noisy
signal and decides whether to invest. At the end of the ﬁrst period, the outcome of
the investment is observed. The monitor updates his assessment of the manager type
λt. He punishes the bad outcome according to the function G(λt). His monitoring
activity uncovers the manager’s type with probability f(x) when the investment fails.
The manager will be ﬁred once he is discovered to be “empire-building,” and the game
terminates.
When the managerial type is not discovered, or the manager is conﬁrmed to be
the “good” type, the game proceeds to the second period. The manager again faces
an investment opportunity of size 1, observes his noisy private signal, and makes his
investment decision. At the end of the second period, the investment outcome is
observed. Again, the monitor can investigate and punish failed investment. Finally,
the ﬁrm liquidates and the game ends.
In the base model, the exogenous punishment, G(λt), satisﬁes the following two
conditions.
Condition a) γ(1 − f(x))Ub(−a,ka,G(λt)) + γf(x)Ub(−a,ka,G(0))
+ (1 − γ)Ub(a,ka,0) > 0,
9Condition b) γUg(a,0) + (1 − γ)(1 − f(x))Ug(−a,G(λt))
+ (1 − γ)f(x)Ug(−a,0) > 0.
Condition (a) says that when considering single period utility, the “empire-building”
manager (undiscovered) always wants to invest, regardless of his signal.
Condition (b) says that the good manager will always invest after receiving a good
signal, although there is a chance that the signal may be wrong, and he may be punished
for the bad outcome when his type is not revealed.
A strategy for the monitor is simply a rule that speciﬁes how much he should invest
in the monitoring technology at the beginning of the game, given his prior assessment
of the manager’s type, the noise level of the manager’s signal, and his shareholdings.
A strategy for the manager has two components. The ﬁrst is a rule that speciﬁes
his investment decision given his private signal in the ﬁrst period for each type the
manager might be. The second is a rule that speciﬁes his investment decision given his
private signal in the second period, if he stays in the game.
In addition to a strategy for the monitor, we need also to specify the monitor’s
beliefs about the type of the manager, which will depend on the manager’s initial
reputation and the manager’s ﬁrst-period record.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game consists of a strategy for the manager,
a strategy and beliefs for the monitor that satisfy three properties. First, the monitor’s
beliefs are consistent with the manager’s strategy in the sense that they are generated
by Bayes updating whenever possible. Second, the monitor’s strategy is optimal given
his beliefs and the strategy of the manager. Third, the manager’s strategy is optimal
given the monitor’s beliefs and strategy.
103 Equilibrium and Improvement in Investment
Eﬃciency
This section solves for the equilibrium of the game by backward induction, and analyzes
the manager’s equilibrium investment choices.
The Manager’s Second-Period Behavior
Condition (b) ensures that the good manager will invest when he receives a good
signal, since the noisy signal is informative — it is accurate with a probability larger
than 1/2.
The strategy of the “empire-building” manager is diﬀerent. During the second
period, the “empire-building” manager has no concern for termination. By condition
(a), he will invest regardless of his signal. If there is no monitoring during the last
period, his expected utility is
E[Vb,t2] = 1
2(Ub(−a,ka,0) + Ub(a,ka,0)),
If the “empire-building” type was discovered during the previous period, he is ter-
minated from the game. His expected utility will be zero in the second period.
The Manager’s First-Period Behavior
In the ﬁrst period, the good manager will invest only if he receives a good signal.
Our attention is focused on the “empire-building” manager. We want to know when
there will be an improvement in investment eﬃciency, i.e., when the “empire-building”
type will not invest after receiving a bad signal.5
When the “empire-building” manager receives a bad signal at the beginning of the
5The bad manager will invest with probability 1 if he receives a good signal. Although with
probability 1−γ, the investment return will be negative and he will be discovered and punished with
a positive probability (1−γ)f(x), his expected utility from investing is higher than from not investing.
11ﬁrst period, his expected total payoﬀ from investing will be,
E[Vb,λ0,t1(−1,I)] = γ(1 − f(x))Ub(−a,ka,G(λ1))
+γf(x)Ub(−a,ka,G(0))
+(1 − γ)Ub(a,ka,0) + δ(1 − γf(x))E[Vb,t2],
and his expected payoﬀ from not investing will be,
E[Vb,λ0,t1(−1,N)] = 0 + δE[Vb,t2].
If
E[Vb,λ0,t1(−1,I) > E[Vb,λ0,t1(−1,N)], (1)
then the “empire-building” manager will always invest when receiving a bad signal;
and if
E[Vb,λ0,t1(−1,I) < E[Vb,λ0,t1(−1,N)], (2)
then the “empire-building” manager will never invest when receiving a bad signal;
and if
E[Vb,λ0,t1(−1,I) = E[Vb,λ0,t1(−1,N)], (3)
then the “empire-building” manager can play a mixed strategy — he will invest
with probability p ∈ (0, 1) when receiving a bad signal.
12Behavior of the monitor and his beliefs
The monitor’s strategy is to determine how much to invest in the monitoring tech-
nology at the beginning of the game. Larger investment in the technology increases the
likelihood of discovering the manager’s type in the event of bad returns. A suﬃciently
large probability of discovery will discourage the “empire-building” manager from over-
investment. For the monitor, it is subgame perfect to ﬁre the “empire-building” type
once he is discovered in the ﬁrst period, since the expected return for the second pe-
riod is zero when the manager is “empire-building”. The gain from monitoring is the
improved investment eﬃciency when the manager is the “empire-building” type.
Entering the second period, the monitor is fully aware of the “empire-building”
type’s strategy. The threat of termination is no longer real and the monitoring activity
will not improve the expected returns for the monitor. He is indiﬀerent to the choice
between monitoring and not monitoring. The basic model assumes that he gives up
monitoring and the subsequent punishment in the second period.6
How much to spend on the monitoring technology is determined through the mon-




2ωa(λ0(1 + δ)(2γ − 1) + (1 − λ0)(2γ − 1)(1 − p)) − x,
with the participation constraint,
1
2ωa(1 − λ0)(2γ − 1)(1 − p) − x ≥ 0,
where 1
2ωa(1 − λ0)(2γ − 1)(1 − p) is the expected gain from monitoring.
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, the monitor observes the ﬁrst period outcome and
updates his belief. He cannot observe or verify the signal. His belief evolves according
to the Bayes’ rule:





6We can assume a small variable cost  of monitoring to break the tie. The outcomes of the model
do not change. The basic model assumes no punishment in the second period to simplify the algebra.





λ1(λ0,N) = Pr(good manager|N) =
λ0
λ0+(1−λ0)(1−p).
The “bad” manager invests more often than the “good” manager, so the man-
ager’s reputation improves only if there is no investment. It deteriorates less when the
investment is proﬁtable.
Proposition 1: There are three possible outcomes, depending on parameter values:
• the monitor does not invest in a monitoring technology and the “empire-building”
type invests regardless of his signals in both periods;
• the monitor invests a positive amount in a monitoring technology, x =
λ(k−(1−ω)(2γ−1))
bkγδ .
The “empire-building” manager invests only when he receives a good signal in
the ﬁrst period, and invests regardless of his signal in the second period;






2 b k δ +. The “empire-building” manager invests only
when he receives a good signal in the ﬁrst period, and invests regardless of his
signal in the second period.
Proof in Appendix.
For example, with reasonable parameter values such as k=1, δ = 0.9, a=0.1, b=100,
and ω = 0.05, ﬁgure 1 demonstrates the equilibrium outcome.
In area A, inequality (1) is satisﬁed, and there is no monitoring. In area D, in-
equality (2) is satisﬁed, and the “empire-building” type does not invest in the ﬁrst
period with a bad signal. In area C, the monitor has incentives to deviate from the
mixed-strategy equilibrium by investing  more, which reduces the “empire-building”
type’s ﬁrst period investment probability to zero when he receives a bad signal.
14Area B illustrates the extra “uncertainty” cost borne by the monitor. If the mon-
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γ(1−λ). However, the monitor’s ex ante expected gain re-
lies on the expected improvement when the manager is “empire-building”. When the
manager’s initial reputation is above certain threshold, this expected gain diminishes
too much, and no longer covers the monitoring cost. As a result, in area B, the monitor
gives up monitoring ex ante.
4 Empirical Implications
Black (1992),Pound (1992), Guercio (1996), Karpoﬀ, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996),
Wahal (1996), Smith (1996), Gillan and Starks (2000), among many others, have doc-
umented that major public pension funds are the most active institutional investors in
monitoring corporate governance. They started to be active in the later half of 80s.
The model indicates that a favorable assessment on the management and higher level
of uncertainty in the business environment will reduce the eﬀectiveness of this group
of activist. This section tests this implication empirically.
The ﬁrm sample is CRSP and COMPUSTAT ﬁrms from 1980 to 2000. There are
a total of 36,922 ﬁrm-year observations and a total of 7,277 ﬁrms in the sample. Firm
size is the log of market capitalization at the end of June each year. Firms with prior
annual stock return higher than the value-weighted market return (with dividends) are
considered to be those with more favorable assessment on their managers. The level
of uncertainty in the business environment is measured by the dispersion of analyst
earnings forecasts. Analyst earning’s predictions are obtained through I/B/E/S. The
standard deviation of all forecasts covering the current year is normalized by the mean
15of all forecast to proxy for the level of uncertainty of the current year. For ﬁrms with
dispersion ratio above the sample medium in a given year, it is considered to have an
uncertain business environment for that year.
This section tests whether the presence of major public pension funds is correlated
with ﬁrms’ investment expenditure, and if there is any interaction among the fund pres-
ence, assessment of the management, and the level of business uncertainty. A ﬁrm’s
investment expenditure is the total of its capital expenditure and acquisition expendi-
ture (Compustat item 128 and 129) scaled by its total assets (item 6). Share holdings
by major public pension funds at the end of June each year is obtained from Thomson
Financial. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Rule 13f), institutional invest-
ment managers who exercise investment discretion over accounts with publicly traded
securities (section 13(f) securities) and who hold equity portfolios exceeding $100 mil-
lion are required to ﬁle Form 13f within 45 days after the last day of each quarter.
Investment managers must report all holdings in excess of 10,000 shares and/or with
a market value over $200,000.
The major public pension funds that are included in this study are: California public
employees retirement system (CalPERS), California state teachers retirement system,
Colorado public employees retirement association, Florida state board of administra-
tion, Kentucky teachers retirement system, Michigan state treasury, Montana board
of investment, New Mexico educational retirement board, New York state common
retirement fund, New York state teachers retirement system, Ohio public employees
retirement system, Ohio school employees retirement system, Ohio state teachers re-
tirement system, Virginia retirement system, and State of Wisconsin investment board.
I am not able to ﬁnd the holding information for other public pension funds through
the 13f data. The likely reason is that their assets are reported by their outside money
managers.
16The model predicts that an “empire-building” manager is better able to hide when
his/her prior reputation is better and when there is more uncertainty in the business
environment. In this scenario, the eﬀectiveness of an monitor is reduced. Table 1
conﬁrm the model’s equilibrium predictions. The presence of major public pension
funds is signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated with ﬁrm’s expenditure on investments
in the period 1985 to 2000, after they became activists in corporate governance. On
average they reduce investment expenditures by 1% of their total assets. However, if
the ﬁrm performed better than market in the prior year and it has an uncertain business
environment in the current year, this eﬀect is reduced by about 50%. This interaction
between the manager’s reputation, the business uncertainty, and the presence of public
pension fund corresponds to area B on ﬁgure 1.
5 Conclusion
This model of outside monitoring demonstrates that no improvement in investment
eﬃciency are equilibrium outcomes under information asymmetry. This weakness of
outside monitoring does not apply to internal monitoring, such as monitoring by the
board. Being insiders, the board members are able to obtain the relevant information
to reduce the information asymmetry. However, the existing literature on board moni-
toring is mixed. Weisbach (1988) documents a stronger association between prior per-
formance and CEO resignation for companies with outsider-dominated boards. Byrd
and Hickman (1992) ﬁnd that bidding companies with outside directors holding ma-
jority seats on the board have higher announcement abnormal returns during a tender
oﬀer bid. In contrast, Yermack (1996) ﬁnds no association between the percentage of
outside directors and ﬁrm performance, and an inverse relation between board size and
ﬁrm value. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) ﬁnd evidence that CEO involvement in
the selection of new board members leads to fewer independent outside directors. The
17implication of this paper points out the importance of an independent and eﬀective
board in corporate governance.
In this model, the shareholder’s monitoring eﬀort is facilitated by managers’ own
reputation concerns. In the last period of the game, the “empire-building” manager
no longer has reputation concerns. The presence of an external or internal monitor
can no longer improve eﬃciency. This implication suggests that compensation policy
linking retirement beneﬁts to the last period performance may be very important to
correct agency problems. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) show that companies are able to
camouﬂage large amounts of executive compensation through retirement beneﬁts. The
end-game implication of our model supports Bebchuk and Fried (2004)’s argument of
making retirement beneﬁts more transparent and performance sensitive.
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20Appendix
To obtain the pure-strategy equilibrium in which p = 0, the monitor chooses the
minimum level of x that deters the “empire-building” type from investing with bad
signals, and that satisﬁes his participation constraint.
In the pure-strategy equilibrium where p = 1, the monitor does not invest in mon-
itoring. This occurs when E[Vb,λ0,t1(−1,I) > E[Vb,λ0,t1(−1,N)]. It also occurs when
the monitor’s participation constraint is not satisﬁed.
















where p ∈ (0,1), and the monitor’s participation constraint is satisﬁed. However,
the monitor has incentives to deviate by increasing its investment in monitoring by .
This increase changes the payoﬀ to the manager, and he will choose not to invest after
receiving a bad signal in the ﬁrst period, i.e., p=0. As long as  is smaller than the
gain in improved investment eﬃciency, the monitor will increase his investment at time
zero. There is no mixed strategy equilibrium.
21Figure 1: Managerial Initial Reputation, Noise Level, and Equilibria
k=1, delta = 0.9, a=0.1, b=100, ω = 0.05. Initial reputation λ0 ∈ (0, 1). Signal accuracy γ ∈ (0.5, 1).
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